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L SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff apparently misunderstands the basis of the Defendant's appeal in this matter. 
The Defendant has not challenged the Court's specific Findings of Fact. Defendant challenges 
the Court's application of those facts to a determination of custody. In essence, the thrust of the 
Defendant's appeal is that the Court's award of custody to the Plaintiff, based on a finding of 
prior abuse that had no relevance to the Defendant's ability to care for the child is, in essence, a 
punishment of the Defendant instead an award of custody based on the best interests of the child. 
I 
The trial court did not assign the appropriate significance to continuing the stable environment 
the Defendant had been providing for the child for a substantial period of time prior to trial, 
while the child had been living in his home. 
Since the Defendant does not challenge the Court's specific factual findings, there is no 
need to martial the evidence. The error in this case is not in the Court's factual findings, but is in 
the Court's application of those findings to the ultimate issue, that is, an award of custody based 
on the child's best interests. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF SHOULD 
BE STRICKEN FOR FAILURE TO MARTIAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE MISINTERPRETS 
THE BASIS FOR THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. 
The Defendant does not attack the Court's factual findings. In his initial brief, the 
Defendant discusses the factors which the trial court should consider in determining the child's 
best interest prior to awarding custody, as set forth in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1982). The custody evaluator addressed those issues. The trial court addressed those 
issues. However, the trial court determined, that, with reference to nine of the issues, the 
evidence was "evenly based" (Transcript of Trial, hereinafter "T" at 869-871, R at 383-384). 
1 
Even with regard to the issue of abuse, the Court did not find that the child would be in 
danger of abuse at the hands of either party. In fact, the Court specifically found that, whatever 
abuse had been inflicted on the child in the past would not "ever happen again". The Court 
specifically stated "the Court is certain and convinced that, as of the date of trial, the Defendant 
would never raise his hand to this child in that fashion ever again." (R. at 385). Despite this 
finding, the trial court ruled that this factor tipped the scales in favor of awarding custody to the 
Plaintiff. (R. at 385). 
The Defendant does not challenge the Court's factual findings with regard to the factors 
identified in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson and set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Therefore, there is no need to martial the evidence. The basis of the 
Defendant's appeal is that the Court improperly awarded custody based on a factor which the 
Court specifically found was not relevant to the ongoing best interests of the child. 
Abuse may or may not have occurred. The trial court found that it did. For purposes of 
this appeal, the Defendant does not challenge that finding. The Defendant, however, challenges 
the Court's award of custody based on prior abuse where the Court is "certain and convinced that 
as of the date of the trial, Defendant would never raise his hand to this child in that fashion ever 
again."... and that "it is not abuse that would never happen again." (R. at 385). 
As Defendant demonstrated in his principal brief, discussing the cases of Hudema v. 
Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491 (Utah App. 1989) In the Interest ofJJT and TJL 877 P.2d 161 (Utah 
App. 1994), Shioii v. ShioiL 712 P.2d 1997 (Utah 1995), and Lavton v. Lavton. an unpublished 
opinion from the Mississippi Court of Appeals, No. 90-CA-00936 COA, 1998 Miss. App, Lexis 
574 (Miss. App. 1998) [incorrectly cited in the Table of Contents of Appellant's Brief as a 
Minnesota Court of Appeals case], factors relating to the custodial parent, including, but not 
2 
limited to moral character, religious compatibility, and the use of corporal punishment, are 
relevant only to the extent those aspects of the prospective custodial parent's character affect the 
child's best interests. In light of the Court's finding that the past abuse would never happen 
again, the past abuse does not affect the child's best interests, and should not have been the 
pivotal factor on which the Court based it's decision to award custody. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONTINUING THE THEN EXISTING 
STABLE ENVIRONMENT ENJOYED BY THE PARTIES' CHILD IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
HOME. 
Since the parties were on an equal footing with regard to all of the factors discussed by 
the Court which relate to the fitness of the parties to serve as parents at the time of trial, the 
pivotal factor, on which the trial court should have based it's award of custody, is the factor 
discussed at length in Elmer v. Elmer. 116 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989)..."stability." In this case the 
trial court did not even discuss the issue of stability, although the evidence established that the 
child had been in the Defendant's home for a substantial period of time prior to trial and that the 
child had been doing well in that environment. He was bonded to his stepbrother and sister and 
to his stepmother. That stable custody arrangement should have been the deciding factor in this 
admittedly close case. Custody should have been awarded to the Defendant so as to continue 
that custodial arrangement not just to make a temporary order permanent but in recognition of 
the reality of the circumstances affecting the child. 
The Petitioner is correct in her argument that temporary custody is not to be treated as 
permanent custody. However, the trial court cannot ignore the existing custody arrangements at 
the time a custody dispute comes before the court for trial. Where? as here, the child had been in 
the Defendant's home and a member of his family since the date these proceedings commenced, 
in late 1996, except for a brief visit with his mother in Virginia in early 1997 and during the 
3 
summer of 1998, that custody arrangement, consistent with Elmer, must be given substantial 
weight if the child is doing well in that home. In this case, keeping Tristan in the "warm, safe, 
comfortable environment" that existed in the Defendant's home (T. at 106), and keeping Tristan 
in the same school where he had been attending (T. at 119), are factors that not only must be 
considered but, where the parties are even an all other function-related factors, mandates an 
award of custody to the Defendant. 
The continuity and stability which Tristan had been enjoying in the Defendant's home 
should have continued. The Court cited to function related factor that justified removing him 
from the Defendant's home, where he had lived for almost two years, and removing him from 
that home to face an uncertain future with his mother in Europe, except the opportunity to see the 
world. An opportunity to travel would exist were the child to move to Europe with his mother 
but there was no evidence to suggest that this "other factor" would be sufficiently compelling to 
override stability and continuity. See Elmer at 604-605. The trial court's decision awarding 
custody to the Plaintiff should be reversed and an Order should be entered awarding custody of 
the child to the Defendant, in order to preserve the stability Tristan had been enjoying prior to 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not martial evidence in opposition to the trial court's findings because 
the Defendant's Appeal does not attack the trial court's findings. The Defendant's Appeal is 
based on the trial court's application of the facts to the ultimate issue. 
The trial court having found that all of the function-related factors, with the exception of 
continuing the then existing stable custodial arrangement, were equal, and the evidence 
establishing that the home in which Tristan had been living prior to trial, with the Defendant, was 
4 
a stable, nurturing environment, custody should have been awarded to the Defendant so as to 
continue that stable environment for the chi 
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